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Abstract—This paper presents an approach to measuring 
computer security understood as a system property, in the 
category of similar properties, such as safety, reliability, 
dependability, resilience, etc.  First, a historical discussion of 
measurements is presented, beginning with views of Hermann 
von Helmholtz in his 19-th century work “Zählen und Messen”.  
Then, contemporary approaches related to the principles of 
measuring software properties are discussed, with emphasis on 
statistical, physical and software models.  A distinction between 
metrics and measures is made to clarify the concepts.  A brief 
overview of inadequacies of methods and techniques to 
evaluate computer security is presented, followed by a proposal 
and discussion of a practical model to conduct experimental 
security measurements. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HEN Henry I, the King of England, decreed in the 
first half of the XII-th century that a yard shall be 
“the distance from the tip of the King’s nose to the end of 
his outstretched thumb”, neither he nor any of his subjects 
realized that the first standard of measuring length was 
introduced over the ages [1].  The standard of measuring 
length (distance) has significantly evolved, from the ancient 
Egyptian cubit to the one based on physical properties, as 
captured in a diagram presented in Figure 1.     
The current definition of the standard unit of length, a 
meter, involves the speed of light and reads as follows [2]: 
“the length of the path travelled by light in vacuum during a 
time interval of 1/299,792,458 of a second.”  The historical 
evolution of the humankind’s understanding of the unit of 
length, pictured in Figure 1, shows an amazing path, which 
led us from a very vague concept to an extremely precise 
definition based on the speed of light, we have now.  It must 
be noticed, however, that it took us nearly 800 years to 
straighten the concept, which we now take for granted. 
It is the conjecture of this paper that at current stage of 
understanding how to measure security as a system property, 
we are at the point comparable to the early days of 
attempting to measure length.  All methods we have are as 
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vague as the one applied by Henry I to defining the unit of 
length.  In this view, the rest of the paper is devoted to 
clarification of basic concepts of measurement and how they 
can be applied to building a model of security as a system 
property that could be used to measuring security. 
 
 
Fig.  1 Evolution of the concept of unit of length [1] 
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 II. WHAT IS A MEASUREMENT? 
A. Hermann von Helmholtz Concept of Measurement 
Although there are several concepts of measurement, they 
all seem to converge to the idea formulated in the 19-th 
century by Herman von Helmholtz, in his groundbreaking 
work “Zählen und Messen” [3], in which Helmholtz says: 
“The special relation which can exist between the 
attributes of two objects and which is designated 
by us by the name equality is characterized by […] 
Axiom I:  If two magnitudes are equal to a third, 
they are equal to each other.” 
This statement, which may seem trivial from today’s 
perspective, actually is very constructive and quite distinctly 
sets the stage for conducting measurements in a way that it 
determines the following:  a property (called an attribute) of a object to be 
measured;  a standard, that is, in Helmholtz’ words, the third 
magnitude, to which others are compared; and  an existence of a procedure used to make the 
comparisons between magnitudes. 
This procedure is further characterized by von Helmholtz 
in the same work, as follows: 
”The procedure by which we put the two objects 
under proper conditions in order to observe the 
stated result and to be able to establish its 
occurrence or its non-occurrence, we shall 
designate as the method of comparison.” 
Defining measurement procedure as a method of 
comparison, von Helmholtz gives several examples of 
physical quantities that can be measured, by comparison 
with a standard, including distance, time, brightness, pitch of 
tone and weight, measured with the use of scales, for which 
he explains the measurement principle further: 
“… the bodies the weights of which we compare 
can consist of the most different materials and can 
be of different form and volume.  The weight 
which we call equal is only an attribute of these 
bodies discriminated by abstraction.” 
To summarize, the contribution of von Helmholtz was to 
make a clear distinction between three factors necessary for 
a measurement to make sense:  a property to be measured, a 
standard against which comparisons are made, and a 
procedure to determine how exactly make the comparisons. 
In modern terms, the standard can be viewed as a metric, 
and measurement procedure relates to a measure, that is, 
measuring instrument. 
Overall, von Helmholtz’ contribution to measurement 
theory is much broader than that, and as one of the 
investigators of his work states, “Zählen und Messen” is 
“commonly regarded as a turning point between an older 
concept of measurement in which quantity precedes number 
and the present concept in which quantity and number are 
defined separately” [4]. 
B. Statistical Approach to Measurements 
The contribution of von Helmholtz is significant, in terms 
of the logic of measurement and the associated theory.  
However, without questioning his work, newer theories treat 
the measurement processes as statistical in nature.  The 
principal assumption of the statistical approach to 
measurements is that due to the inherent uncertainties in the 
measurement process, the result of a measurement always 
consists of two numbers: the value of the measured quantity 
and the estimation of the measurement uncertainty with 
which this value has been obtained (error). 
With this view, it is easy to recognize that even the most 
common notion of measuring time results in two values.  
When we ask “What time is it?”, we obtain a single value, 
say, 5:30pm, which just happens to be indicated on a watch, 
but with an implicit understanding that the accuracy of this 
time value is one minute.   
To illustrate the significance of the implications of this 
concept, one can show an apparently trivial example of 
measuring the resistance of a DC battery [5].  With a simple 
battery model consisting of an ideal battery (with zero 
resistance) and an ideal resistor connected to it in series, the 
actual measurement circuit will need to have several sources 
of noise, representing uncertainty.  In particular, given some 
simplifying assumptions, such as linear and time-invariant 
circuits and neglecting temperature effects, among the 
factors that cannot be ignored are the following:  noise caused by battery voltage fluctuations and 
thermal effects from the resistor  noise from the voltmeter used in the measurement 
and its calibration error  load resistance, including input impedance of the 
voltmeter. 
Combining all these factors leads to a rather significant 
complication in calculating the battery resistance, making it 
a non-linear computation of what looked like a simple 
application of Ohm’s Law.  Consequently, taking into 
account uncertainties in the measurement process turns out 
to be crucial in providing the quality of measurement values. 
C. Lessons from Measurements in Physics 
To help realize the challenge of measuring properties, one 
can look closer at the extreme of measuring strictly physical 
properties (quantities).  In addition to length, mentioned 
above, among physical properties we are most familiar with 
are time and mass.  
The current definition of a second, a metric (unit) of time, 
involves atomic radiation and reads as follows [2]: “the 
duration of 9 192 631 770 periods of the radiation 
corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine 
levels of the ground state of the cesium 133 atom.”  It must 
be noticed that this definition, just like the one of a unit of 
length, quoted in Section I, evolved historically from much 
less precise definitions and understanding of respective 
quantities.  A historical background can be found at [2]. 
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 The metric of mass (its unit), a kilogram, is currently the 
only physical unit that officially remains defined based on a 
physical artifact, an international prototype stored in the 
International Bureau of Weights and Measures, near Paris.  
However, there is a substantial push towards defining it 
more precisely, using the number of atoms in a silicon 28 
crystal [6]. Developing this new definition has not been fully 
successful, yet, but (in the context of considering definition 
of security) it is worth mentioning, why this is so:  “The 
measurement uncertainty is 1.5 higher than that targeted for 
a kilogram redefinition […].  The measurement accuracy 
seems to be limited by the working apparatuses.”  Clearly, 
any measurement of security must involve the use of 
measuring devices and assessment of their accuracy. 
It may be further argued that security is not a physical 
property and cannot be measured directly, so even 
considering such measurements would make little or no 
sense.  In physics, however, there are examples of 
quantities, which do not measure directly certain properties 
of matter.  One such prominent example is temperature, 
which is essentially a quantity corresponding to and 
measuring kinetic energy. 
It is clear from these lessons that several points have to be 
taken into consideration, if one is to develop scientifically 
based security measurements:  the process of designing a validated metric of 
security may take years, if not decades;  any measures of security must be treated as (physical 
or mental) measurement devices (instruments), to 
which regular statistical measurement theory applies   security is likely to be measured only indirectly, 
possibly via its inherent components. 
D. Software Measurements 
With all that has been said in the subsections above, 
software measurements cause a particular challenge.  First of 
all, software is not a physical quantity, so the question arises 
can we really distinguish some meaningful software 
attributes that would have significance regarding the 
estimation of software quality? In other words, “Analogous 
to physics, there is the idea whether we can compare a 
software quality attribute to a norm” [7]. 
This dilemma has been resolved in two ways.  First, we 
apply a concept of a latent variable, to represent a property 
that cannot be measured directly but can be estimated using 
observable attributes (or respective variables representing 
them) [7].  Second, being aware of our imperfection in 
approaching the measurements of software, similarly to the 
evolution of a concept of measuring length and time, we 
relax the requirement about ultimate quality of software 
measurements by adopting the rule: “For software then, like 
time, we want measures that are practical and that we expect 
will evolve over time to meet the need of the day” [8]. 
The first publication adopting concepts of measurement 
theory to software measurements, and comparing them, 
appears to be [9].  Among the major factors that attention 
should be paid to in software measurements, the authors list 
uncertainty of the measurement, stating that “improvements 
in the maturity of software engineering as a truly 
engineering discipline require for software measurements to 
include the evaluation of measurements uncertainty 
whenever measurement results are expressed” [9].  
However, they further apply measurement concepts to the 
function-point analysis, which is a method estimating 
development effort not the quality of software itself. 
III. CAN SECURITY BE MEASURED? 
A. Overview 
There have been numerous publications in the last decade 
on security assessment, including books [10-11], research 
and engineering papers [12-13], government reports [14-16], 
and Internet sources [17-18], all of them discussing security 
metrics.  However, a vast majority of them deal with metrics 
at the management level and have very little to do with 
measurement in a scientific sense of the term, as developed 
in measurement theory [5,7-8].   
What is meant by security metrics in these publications is 
primarily adherence to standards, whether established 
industry standards [19-21] or internal company standards 
[22-23], leading to the assessment of how security policies 
are executed, for example, by implementing respective 
processes and auditing them.  As one paper defines it [24], 
security metrics mean “the measurement of the effectiveness 
of the organization’s security efforts over time.”  While this 
way of security assessment is beneficial and productive, 
measuring security as a property of a computing system or 
software is not particularly well developed. 
What is of specific interest in the current paper is not 
security at the enterprise or the organization level, but rather 
how security as a computer system property or software 
property can contribute to protecting information and other 
resources during system’s operation.  In this regard, security 
can be viewed as one specific aspect of system’s 
dependability, the other two aspects being safety and 
reliability, with one of the earliest papers addressing this 
issue published over twenty years ago [25]. 
Such focus on quantitative assessment of operational 
aspects of security has become more popular in recent years. 
A thorough survey has been published in 2009 [26], 
covering quantitative representation and analysis of 
operational security since 1981, and addressing the question 
whether “security can correctly be represented with 
quantitative information?”  The major finding of this study 
was that “there exists significant work for quantified 
security, but there is little solid evidence that the methods 
represent security in operational settings.”  This brings us to 
the question “Is security measurable?”  Before that, it would 
be even more important to answer a more fundamental 
question: “Why do we measure?” 
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 B. Why Do We Measure? 
There is an often quoted and famous statement by Lord 
Kelvin [27] that “when you can measure what you are 
speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know 
something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when 
you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a 
meagre and unsatisfactory kind”.  Similar motivations 
guided generations of physicists who gave us all the 
discoveries thanks to which we are now able to define the 
basic metrics of physical quantities so precisely.  Despite a 
different nature of software, which is not a material entity, 
this view of measurement can be also pursued. 
Software engineering, being a young discipline, does not 
have its Lord Kelvin, yet, but one name is certainly worth 
mentioning.  Watts Humphrey deserves quoting, having said 
[28] that “quality management is impossible without quality 
measures and quality data. As long as software people try to 
improve quality without measuring and managing quality, 
they will make little or no progress.” This is the main 
premise why measurements are critical for any software 
controlled system. Introduction of rigorous processes based 
on measurements allows software organizations improve 
their products, reaching higher capability maturity levels. 
For a complete picture, it is worthwhile including a 
comment from an electrical engineer, published in a systems 
engineering magazine [29].  After outlining significant 
deficiencies in current approaches to security and pointing to 
successes of engineering disciplines, which base their 
designs on scientific measurements, Fred Cohen writes: 
“As systems engineers, it would be nice to be able 
to use the same sorts of notions of design for 
information security as we use for other sorts of 
design. It would be nice to be able to have standard 
units of measurement against which we could test 
things. It would be nice to be able to develop tools 
for measurement that could be calibrated against 
the standards, to have a theoretical basis for 
developing a mathematics and testing it, and then 
to be able to build up a systems engineering 
approach to information security like we do in 
other engineering ﬁelds. But ﬁrst, we need to be 
able to make meaningful measurements.” 
With these three sample views, coming from a physicist, a 
software engineer and an electrical/systems engineer, it 
becomes quite obvious that the measurements are necessary 
to improve decision making.  In engineering, we have to say 
it even more strongly, that we measure properties to receive 
adequate information to determine system’s behavior and be 
able to better control system’s parameters.  Thus, what has 
been also expressed in the most recent security research 
quite clearly [16,30-31], we want to measure security to 
predict system’s behavior and better respond to potential 
threats or, at least, estimate the associated risks.  As one 
author stated it rather bluntly [32]: “And until we can 
measure security, we can’t improve it.” 
C. Measurable or Not? 
As the quoted author stated in [32], and several other 
publications expressed as well [33-36], there are significant 
concerns about the feasibility of security assessment, with 
some authors even arguing that security as a system property 
is not measurable [37-38].  In particular, [38] presents a 
view that any security metric must be a computable function 
mapping a set of features of systems, subject to security 
concerns, into the real numbers.  Under this assumption, 
introducing a system model with an owner, its adversaries, 
and an observer, it is claimed that security is non-
measurable for the combination of the following three 
reasons:  the set of unmitigated weaknesses (vulnerabilities) is 
not measurable by anyone, including the owner of 
the system;  the set of weaknesses (vulnerabilities) known to the 
observer is not known by the owner of the system 
and thus is not measurable by the owner; and  no system owner can know the totality of his 
adversaries. 
Other authors are less skeptical, advocating respective 
developments [39] and even outlining a number of reasons 
why measuring security is hard but feasible, including [40]:  impossibility of testing all security requirements  interactions between measurements and security  changes in the environment imposed by adversaries  subjectivity of the evaluators. 
In addition, the same authors also offer some guidance, 
which are mainly considerations on what should be included 
in security measurement to make it “more accurate and 
useful.”  Among those suggestions several are worth 
mentioning [40]: (a) building adequate models; (b) using a 
set of metrics as opposed to a single metric; (b) use different 
metrics for different purposes; (c) embrace uncertainty.   
In the editorial introduction to the special issue of IEEE 
Security and Privacy Magazine, on the Science of Security 
[41], the guest editors also express skepticism about 
measurability of security properties, and anticipate a rough 
road to reaching this goal, saying that: “We’re a long way 
from establishing a science of security comparable to the 
traditional physical sciences, and even from knowing 
whether such goal is even achievable.” 
The same authors, in another article for this issue of IEEE 
Security and Privacy [42], referring to “Lord Kelvin’s oft-
repeated maxim,” argue that the essential issue in making 
progress in security measurement is the existence and 
usefulness of respective tools.  They offer a tip to pursue 
security metrics saying that two types of metrics can and 
need to be pursued: “either analytical or experimental.” 
As pointed out in the aforementioned editorial, we should 
aim at making the security measurement process comparable 
to those used in physical sciences.  Let’s look, then, into the 
ways the values of security can be assessed using scientific 
methods, similar to those of measuring physical quantities. 
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 IV. MODEL FOR SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
A. Scientific Approaches to Measurement 
Following the observation from [42], for assessment of 
value of a system property, where there is no science or 
theory developed, one could try conducting measurement 
experiments. Nevertheless, if experimental assessment of a 
system property quantitatively is impossible or difficult, one 
can also apply simulation.  As Glimm and Sharp, for 
example, point out [43]: “It is an old saw that science has 
three pillars: theory, experiment, and simulation.”  This 
principle is broadly applied in physics, the mother of 
modern sciences, but it has been also adopted in various 
ways in computing [44-45].   
A closer look at selected computing disciplines reveals 
that, knowingly or not, this principle has merit, for example, 
in computer networks.  Analytical modeling of network 
traffic is usually done using queuing theory, measuring 
network parameters, such as throughput and latency, is done 
via experiments, and computer simulations use combined 
computational models to accomplish what cannot be done 
with theory or live experiments. 
However, before any theory, experiment or simulation is 
developed, putting cards on the table is necessary by 
developing an initial model of the phenomena whose 
properties are to be measured.  This is the critical first step 
to conduct the measurement. 
B. General Modeling Objectives 
Summarizing the discussion thus far, the critical elements 
in measurements of any property are the following: 
1) Clearly identify the property to be measured.  It is at 
this point where building a model of the phenomenon 
is necessary.  We use the term “property”, although in 
measurement theory [46], it is called measurand. 
2) Establish a metric to quantitatively characterize the 
property.  Ideally, this would be a unit of 
measurement, but for vaguely defined properties it can 
be just a standard against which measurements are 
applied, or a scale against which the property can be 
evaluated. 
3) Develop a measure, which would apply the metric to 
related objects under investigation.  Ideally, this is just 
a measuring instrument, but for vaguely defined 
metrics it can be a formula or any other mental device 
to apply a metric.  One important characteristic of a 
measure should be its linearity, that is, any two 
identical changes in the property value should be 
reflected as two identical changes in the measure. 
4) Design the measurement process to deliver results.  An 
important part of this process is calibration1 of the 
                                                          
1 The International Vocabulary of Metrology [46] defines calibration as 
“operation that, under specified conditions, in a first step, establishes a 
relation between the quantity values with measurement uncertainties 
provided by measurement standards and corresponding indications with 
associated measurement uncertainties and, in a second step, uses this 
measuring device [46], an activity almost never 
thought of in soft sciences. Another crucial component 
of this process is the collection and availability of data. 
5) Make sure that each instance of a measurement 
delivers a result composed of the value of the 
measurement and the estimate of its accuracy (an 
error).  Alternatively, and consistently with current 
views in measurement theory, it could be a rage of 
values designating one value as “measured quantity 
value” [46]. 
So knowing all this, now the question is, are we able to 
develop a model for security measurement? It should 
embrace all important factors regarding this phenomenon. 
C. Architectural Model for Security Assessment 
Various types of mathematical models exist to depict 
physical and mental phenomena, all forming the basis of 
modern science and engineering.  Some of them are 
continuous, for example, differential equations, but most of 
those used in computing are discrete, such as queuing 
theory, finite state machines, network and graph models 
(Bayesian networks, Petri nets, Markov chains), rule-based 
systems, etc., including what is called formal methods.  
An interesting approach to modeling measurement 
processes is presented in [9] and involves the IDEF0 process 
notation specified in the Federal Information Processing 
Standard [47].  This model is shown in Figure 2 and 
includes the phenomenon being measured, shown as a 
process, and the control unit representing an entity receiving 
measurement results and taking respective actions. A 
number of additional inputs to both the process and the 
control unit are considered as well. 
 
 
Fig.  2 Modeling of measurement activities according to [9] 
 
We propose the adaptation of this model, making it closer 
to those used in control theory, which can reflect an impact 
of external circumstances on computer system’s security. 
Taking the analogy with control engineering, one would 
only keep interfaces relevant to security during system’s 
operation and, as a result, derive a model of an embedded 
                                                                                                  
information to establish a relation for obtaining a measurement result from 
an indication.” 
JANUSZ ZALEWSKI ET AL.: MEASURING SECURITY 135
 controller (or more broadly, a cyberphysical system) subject 
to security threats as shown in Figure 3. 
The diagram shows that multiple controller interfaces to 
the process, the operator, the network, and the database, are 
all subject to security threats, forming the attack surface.  
More importantly, to take the analogy further, just like 
control theory assumes that the controlled process (a plant) 
is subject to disturbances, security theory, if one is 
developed for this model, could assume that known or 
unknown threats play the role of disturbances to the 
controller.  While the control theory can make usually 
realistic assumptions about the statistical nature of 
disturbances (e.g., Gaussian noise), it would be challenging 




Fig.  3 Generic view of an embedded controller with security threats 
 
In this model, vulnerabilities affecting the controller are 
understood as an “asset or group of assets that can be 
exploited by one or more threats” [48] or as a “weakness in 
an information system, system security procedures, internal 
controls, or implementation that could be exploited by a 
threat source” [49], while a threat can be defined as “a state 
of the system or system environment which can lead to 
adverse effects” [50]. Consequently, the disturbances in 
Figure 3 are an abstraction incorporating all threats relevant 
to security and play a role in assessing security. 
This is our generic model of a cyberphysical system 
subject to security threats. It has internal vulnerabilities and 
an attack surface composed of four interfaces. It is a 
precondition to meet objective (1) from Section IV-B. Now 
the question is how to define its security property? 
D.  Definition of the Term 
From what has been written in general literature on 
security measurements, cited earlier in this paper, it is not a 
simple and unique property, which could be easily identified 
and defined.  Literature on cyberphysical systems is already 
big and exponentially growing, but is relatively silent on the 
issue of security measurement [51-52].  We are, therefore, 
proposing our own approach, which is based on a 
multifaceted view of security and its measurement.   
Looking at definitions of security in established standard 
glossaries, such as [49] or [53], it becomes immediately 
clear that in none of these documents security is defined as a 
system property. For example, one of several definitions in 
[53] reads as follows: “Protection of information and data so 
that unauthorized persons or systems cannot read or modify 
them and authorized persons or systems are not denied 
access to them” and a corresponding one in [49]: “A 
condition that results from the establishment and 
maintenance of protective measures that enable an enterprise 
to perform its mission or critical functions despite risks 
posed by threats to its use of information systems.”   
These are both good definitions, but not for our purposes, 
because they both refer to security as a state, as opposed to 
ability.  A definition of security as a system property must 
imply that one wants to measure it.  In this regard, just like 
for several other properties, the definition should include a 
phrase “the extent to which” or “the degree to which.”  
Consequently, we propose adopting the definition of 
security from [53], to read as follows:  
security. The extent to which information and data 
are protected so that unauthorized persons or 
systems cannot read or modify them and 
authorized persons or systems are not denied 
access to them. 
What is additionally important and captured well in [53] is 
the fact that the secure system must be not only protected 
against threats but also accessible to those authorized. 
Having the definition in place, one needs to figure how to 
assess “the extent” or “the degree” to which the conditions 
spelled out in the definition are met?  The community has 
adopted several ways to do it.  One view, which gained 
especially wide popularity, is called C-I-A triad, where the 
acronym comes from the first letters of, what are called, 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability [54]. The 
assessment of the degree to which a system is secure is 
based on meeting the three criteria of the C-I-A triad. 
Another broadly adopted view to assess security is based 
on the STRIDE threat model, which determines the security 
of the system based on how well it is protected against the 
following six specific threats: Spoofing Identity, Tampering 
with Data, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of 
Service, and Elevation of Privilege [55]. 
We tend to agree with these multifaceted views of 
assessing security.  To use a trivial comparison, measuring 
security is like assessing patient’s health.  It is necessary for 
a doctor to look at more than one parameter to determine a 
proper diagnosis or to discover a potential disease.  
Analogically, from the security perspective, we are looking 
for system health involving multiple indicators, not just one.  
Additionally, we must take into account that security 
situation changes over time [56], so the system is dynamical 
and the security assessment must be continuous.  
This merely concludes meeting objective (1) outlined in 
Section IV-B and gives a background to meet objective (2). 
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 V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Outline of Establishing a Security Measurement Process 
Thus far, we have determined the model for security 
assessment for one particular class of systems, cyberphysical 
systems, and defined security as a term.  What is necessary 
in the next step is developing the measurement process (with 
metrics and measures) for measuring security in the 
proposed context. This is, of course, an open question and a 
tremendous challenge. 
The model of Figure 3 forms the basis for building a case 
study for security assessment, by analyzing threats and 
vulnerabilities. The traditional way of determining and 
investigating threats is done using attack trees, supported 
with methods like STRIDE or DREAD as tools for general 
security analysis [57-58]. In this paper, because of the need 
for more quantitative approach, an alternative method is 
suggested, based on assessing the vulnerabilities as per the 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [59-60]. 
To recap what we are looking for, let’s repeat that items 
(2)-(4) from Section IV-B have to be addressed: a metric, 
which for CVSS is a continuous numerical scale; a measure, 
which for CVSS is a set of integrated formulas; and the 
measurement process, which in this case relies on applying 
the measures to continuously collected data.  With these 
assumptions, the data can be obtained by online checking of 
the subject entity (embedded device, server, cyberphysical 
system, etc., for which security is being measured) for 
known vulnerabilities, as per the Common Vulnerability 
Exposure (CVE) database [61]. Then calculating the security 
score based on the CVSS can be accomplished. Several 
authors have proposed similar methodologies to use 
CVE/CVSS data [62-63] for security measurement 
purposes, although without actual theoretical underpinning. 
The challenge is the unpredictable nature of threats.  Even 
if one can design countermeasures for existing threats and 
assess those, there is high likelihood that new, unknown, 
threats will appear, so one has to design the security system 
for the unknown, as well as include this type of 
unpredictability in the computational model for security 
assessment.  The lack of sufficient information for 
calculating security values suggests building a model based 
on one of the theories, which deal with uncertainty, for 
example Bayesian belief networks [64], Dempster-Shafer 
theory [65], fuzzy sets [66] or rough sets [67]. 
B. Overview of a Case Study in Aviation 
The aircraft internal networks tied with air traffic 
management and airline operations bring security to the 
forefront, because they may adversely affect flight safety. 
This would fit in the model presented in Figure 3. However, 
the existing aircraft system safety guidance does not address 
airborne networks and data security issues.   
Even though the RTCA committee on Aeronautical 
Systems Security, SC-216, completed Airworthiness 
Security Process Specification guidance, DO-326/ED202, in 
2010 [68], its work focuses on processes, methods and 
considerations, staying away from engineering and scientific 
approach based on measurements and analyses. Often the 
terminology used in the documents contradicts that used by 
scientific community. As an example, the aviation 
community uses term “measures” to represent the 
procedures, approaches, and tools used to mitigate the 
security threat (which in common language are “mitigation 
measures” or “countermeasures”). 
There is an evident challenge to quantitatively 
characterize the security properties. Nevertheless, there is a 
significant practice, established in the safety domain, to use 
a metric based on ranking applied on an ordinal scale. Clear 
and unambiguous determination of the metric’s scale 
categories (with assigned ranks) would allow developing 
effective measures leading to modeling of security for 
specific assets. However, the measurements would need to 
be based on the developers' experience and collection of 
well scrutinized historical data. The resulting measurement 
(rank or category) would be representing the value, while 
the accuracy is defined by the category boundaries. Just like 
in the case described in previous subsection, due to the 
subjective nature of assessment and lack of sufficient 
information, it might be useful to explore the application of 
theories dealing with uncertainty [64-67]. 
Security property is often assessed indirectly, in terms of 
risk. Similar to the safety domain, where risk is defined as a 
combination of probability of hazard and severity of the 
potential consequences, the security domain also uses this 
concept.  The metrics used for assessing such security 
aspects as attacker profile, vulnerabilities, operational 
conditions, or threat conditions, are defined in terms of 
likelihood (or probabilities). Again, these metrics are more 
ordinal than numerical. Metrics such as likelihood of attack, 
impact of a successful attack, level of exposure 
(vulnerability), are very subjective, ill-defined, and 
collecting data for them is an obvious challenge. The typical 
categorization of the attack likelihood is presented below:  Frequent – anticipated to occur routinely in the life 
of each asset.  Probable – unlikely to occur during a routine 
operation but may occur a few times in the life of an 
asset.  Remote – unlikely to occur during its total life but 
may occur several times in the total life of an entire 
group of this type of assets.  Extremely Remote – occurrence not anticipated 
during its total life but may occur a few times in the 
total life of entire group of this type of assets.  Extremely Improbable – occurrence not anticipated 
during the entire operational life of all assets of this 
type. 
The obvious question is what does it mean “routinely”, 
“unlikely”, “not anticipated”? How much is “few” or 
“several”? There is no agreement on specific numerical 
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 values and assessment of these likelihoods is difficult. 
Similarly, typical categorization of a successful attack’s 
impact or consequence is:  Catastrophic – loss of system (occurrence of 
multiple fatalities).  Hazardous – large reduction in safety margins or 
functional capabilities (potential serious or fatal 
injury).  Major – significant reduction in safety margins or 
functional capabilities.  Minor – slight reduction in safety margins or 
functional capabilities.  No Safety Effect – no impact on the operational 
capability of the system. 
Again, the questions are: what is “slight”, “significant” or 
“large”? 
Using similar categories we can classify vulnerability 
level of the asset (e.g., highly vulnerable, vulnerable, 
marginally vulnerable, not vulnerable) and the effectiveness 
of the applied countermeasures (e.g., highly effective, 
effective, marginally effective, not effective). 
The current trend in aviation security [68] is to use the 
term "characteristics" to denote "property" used in this 
paper. The aviation community agrees on the following set 
of parameters defining security property (S) under specific 
operational conditions (indicated as O):  A - likelihood of attack  V - level of asset vulnerability  E - effectiveness of applied countermeasures  I - level of impact upon successful attack. 
There has been little discussion on how these parameters 
should be measured, less even what models are reflecting 
their interrelations.  Considering the discrete and ordinal 
nature of the above parameters, there is a possibility to 
create mathematical model of security S in a form of a 
discrete function: 
S = f(A, V, E, I, O) 
Evidently, higher ranks of parameters A, V, and I would 
have a negative impact and thus decrease the security value, 
while higher rank of parameter E would have positive 
impact on security as the system property.  Based on 
historical data and actual assessment of security an attempt 
can be made to identify the f() function. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a view on addressing an enormous 
challenge of measuring computer security as a system 
property. Guided by principles of measurements introduced 
in the 19-th century by Hermann von Helmholtz, as well as 
by the statistical nature of measurements, and facing some 
fundamental questions whether security is a measurable 
property, a high-level model for security assessment is 
proposed.  This model is built exploiting an analogy with a 
control system, treating threats as disturbances to the 
controller. The proposed model requires identifying 
measured property, establish appropriate metric, developing 
measure and the measurement process, and finally present 
the results in form of a value with an associated accuracy. 
This model can be only as good as the data set to which it 
can be applied.  With a chronic lack of reliable data related 
to security threats and vulnerabilities, it is proposed to use 
the National Vulnerability Database [61] and apply to it the 
Common Vulnerability Scoring Systems (CVSS) [59-60], to 
derive security assessment using computational methods 
dealing with uncertainty.  Comparing the process of security 
assessment to the development of measurement standards 
and processes for physical quantities, such as length or time, 
it is anticipated that refining and adjusting the concepts of 
computer security assessment may take decades and in fact 
is a challenge for the entire generation. 
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